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Abstract
This paper provides a tractable continuous-time constant-absolute-risk averse (CARA)-Gaussian
framework to quantitatively explore how the preference for robustness (RB) affects the interest
rate, the dynamics of consumption and income, and the welfare costs of model uncertainty in
general equilibrium. We show that RB significantly reduces the equilibrium interest rate, and
reduces (increases) the relative volatility of consumption growth to income growth when the
income process is stationary (non-stationary). Furthermore, we find that the welfare costs of
model uncertainty are nontrivial for plausibly estimated income processes and calibrated RB
parameter values. Finally, we extend the benchmark model to consider the separation of risk
aversion and intertemporal substitution, incomplete information about income, and regime-
switching in income growth.
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1. Introduction
Hansen and Sargent (1995) first formally introduced the preference for robustness (RB, a concern
for model misspecification) into linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) economic models.1 In robust
control problems, agents are concerned about the possibility that their true model is misspecified
in a manner that is difficult to detect statistically; consequently, they make their optimal deci-
sions as if the subjective distribution over shocks is chosen by an evil agent in order to minimize
their expected lifetime utility.2 As showed in Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (HST, 1999) and Luo
and Young (2010), robustness models can produce precautionary savings even within the class
of discrete-time LQG models, which leads to analytical simplicity. Specifically, using the explicit
consumption-saving rules, they explored how RB affects consumption and saving decisions and
found that the preference for robustness and the discount factor are observationally equivalent in
the sense that they lead to the identical consumption and saving decisions within the discrete-time
representative-agent LQG setting. However, if we consider problems outside the LQG setting
(e.g., when the utility function is constant-absolute-risk-averse, i.e., CARA, or constant-relative-
risk-averse, i.e., CRRA), RB-induced worst-case distributions are generally non-Gaussian, which
greatly complicates the computational task.3
The permanent income hypothesis (PIH) of Friedman states that the individual consumer’s
optimal consumption is determined by permanent income that equals the annuity value of his
total resources: the sum of (i) financial wealth and (ii) human wealth defined as the discounted
present value of the current and expected future labor income using the exogenously given risk-
free rate. Hall (1978) showed that when some restrictions are imposed (e.g., quadratic utility and
the equality between the interest rate and the discount rate), the PIH emerges and changes in
consumption are unpredictable. Consequently, the PIH consumer saves only when he anticipates
that their future labor income will decline. This saving motive is called the demand for “savings
for a rainy day”. In contrast, Caballero (1990) examined a precautionary saving motive due to
the interaction of risk aversion and unpredictable future income uncertainty when the consumer
has CARA utility. The Caballero model leads to a constant precautionary savings demand and a
constant dissavings term due to relative impatience. Wang (2003) showed in a Bewley-Caballero-
Huggett equilibrium model that the precautionary saving demand and the impatience dissavings
term cancel out in a general equilibrium and the PIH reemerges.
1See Hansen and Sargent (2007) for a textbook treatment on robustness.
2The solution to a robust decision-maker’s problem can be regarded as the equilibrium of a max-min game between
the decision-maker and the evil agent.
3See Chapter 1 of Hansen and Sargent (2007) for discussions on the computational difficulties in solving non-LQG
RB models, and Colacito, Hansen, and Sargent (2007), Bidder and Smith (2012), and Young (2012) for using numerical
methods to compute the worst-case distributions.
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The main goal of this paper is to construct a tractable continuous-time CARA-Gaussian heterogenous-
agent dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to link the two research lines dis-
cussed above and explore how robustness affects the interest rate, the cross-sectional distributions
of consumption and income, and welfare costs of model uncertainty in the presence of uninsurable
labor income.4 As the first contribution of this paper, we show that this continuous-time DSGE
model featuring incomplete markets and the separation of risk aversion and robustness can be
solved explicitly. Using the explicit consumption-saving rules, we find that risk aversion is more
important than robustness in determining the precautionary savings demand.5 In addition, we
establish the observational equivalence results between risk aversion, robustness, and discounting
in our continuous-time model.
Second, using the explicit decision rules, we show that a general equilibrium under RB can be
constructed in the vein of Bewley (1986) and Huggett (1993).6 In the general equilibrium, we find
that the interest rate decreases with the degree of RB. The intuition is that the stronger the pref-
erence for RB, the greater the amount of model uncertainty determined by the interaction of risk
aversion, RB, and labor income uncertainty, and the less the interest rate. In addition, we show that
the relative volatility of consumption growth to income growth is determined by the interaction
of the equilibrium interest rate and the persistence coefficient of the income process. Specifically,
this relative volatility decreases (increases) with RB when the income process is stationary (non-
stationary).
Third, after calibrating the RB parameter using the detection error probabilities (DEP), we find
that RB has significant impacts on the equilibrium interest rate and consumption volatility. In
the U.S. economy the average real risk-free interest rate is only about 1 percent between 1985 and
2014. The full-information rational expectations model requires the coefficient of risk aversion
parameter to be 10 to match this rate.7 In contrast, when consumers take into account model
uncertainty, the model can generate an equilibrium interest rate of 1 percent with much lower
values of the coefficient of risk aversion.8 In addition, we find that when income uncertainty
4See Cagetti, Hansen, Sargent, and Williams (2002), Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2003), Maenhout (2004), and
Kasa (2006) for the applications of robustness in continuous-time models.
5Within the discrete-time LQG setting, Luo, Nie, and Young (2012) showed that although both RB and CARA pref-
erences increase the precautionary savings demand via the intercept terms in the consumption functions, they have
distinct implications for the marginal propensity to consume out of permanent income (MPC).
6Wang (2003) constructed a general equilibrium under full-information rational expectations (FI-RE) in the same
Bewley-Huggett type model economy with the CARA utility.
7Note that since we set the mean income level to be 1, the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) evaluated at
this level is equal to the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (CARA).
8Barillas, Hansen, and Sargent (2009) showed that most of the observed high market price of risk in the U.S. can
be reinterpreted as a market price of model uncertainty and we can thus reinterpret the risk-aversion parameter as
measuring the representative agent’s doubts about the model specification.
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increases, the relative volatility decreases for any values of ϑ.9 Using the Lucas elimiation-of-risk
method, we find that the welfare costs due to model uncertainty are non-trivial. For plausibly
parameter values, they could be as high as 10% of the typical consumer’s permanent income.
Finally, we consider three extensions. In the first extension, we assume that consumers have
recursive utility and have distinct preferences for risk and intertemporal substitution. In the sec-
ond extension, we follow Pischke (1995) and Wang (2004) and assume that consumers can observe
the total income but cannot distinguish the individual income components. In the final extension,
we consider regime-switching in income growth and explore how it interacts with RB and affects
the equilibrium interest rate and consumption volatility.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a robustness version of the Caballero–
Bewley-Huggett type model with incomplete markets and precautionary savings. Section 3 dis-
cusses the general equilibrium implications of RB for the interest rate and consumption and wealth
dynamics. Section 4 present our quantitative results after estimating the income process and cali-
brating the RB parameter. Section 5 discusses how RB help explain the observed low interest rate
in the U.S. Section 6 considers three extensions. Section 7 concludes.
2. A Continuous-time Heterogeneous-Agent Economy with Robustness
2.1. The Full-information Rational Expectations Model with Precautionary Savings
Following Wang (2003, 2009), we first formulate a continuous-time full-information rational ex-
pectations (FI-RE) Caballero-type model with precautionary savings. Specifically, we assume that
there is only one risk-free asset in the model economy and there are a continuum of consumers
who face uninsurable labor income and make optimal consumption-saving decisions. Uninsur-
able labor income (yt) is assumed to follow an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process:
dyt = ρ
(
µ
ρ
− yt
)
dt + σydBt, (1)
where the unconditional mean and variance of income are y = µ/ρ and σ2y / (2ρ), respectively, the
persistence coefficient ρ governs the speed of convergence or divergence from the steady state,10
Bt is a standard Brownian motion on the real line R, and σy is the unconditional volatility of the
9This theoretical result might provide a potential explanation for the empirical evidence documented in Blundell,
Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) that income and consumption inequality diverged over the sampling period they study.
10If ρ > 0, the income process is stationary and deviations of income from the steady state are temporary; if ρ ≤ 0,
income is non-stationary. The last case catches the flavor of Hall and Mishkin (1982)’s the specification of individual
income that includes a non-stationary component. The ρ = 0 case corresponds to a simple Brownian motion without
drift. The larger ρ is, the less y tends to drift away from y. As ρ goes to ∞, the variance of y goes to 0, which means that
y can never deviate from y.
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income change over an incremental unit of time. The typical consumer is assumed to maximize
the following expected lifetime utility:
J0 = E0
[ˆ ∞
t=0
exp (−δt) u(ct)dt
]
, (2)
subject to the evolution of financial wealth (wt):
dwt = (rwt + yt − ct) dt, (3)
and a transversality condition, limt→∞ E |exp (−δt) Jt| = 0, where r is the return to the risk-free
asset, c is consumption, and the utility function takes the CARA form: u(ct) = − exp (−γct) /γ,
where γ > 0 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.11 To present the model more compact, we
define a new state variable, st:
st ≡ wt + ht,
where ht is human wealth at time t and is defined as the expected present value of current and
future labor income discounted at the risk-free interest rate r:
ht ≡ Et
[ˆ ∞
t
exp (−r (s− t)) ysds
]
.
For the given the income process, (1), ht = yt/ (r + ρ) + µ/ (r (r + ρ)).12 Following the state-
space-reduction approach proposed in Luo (2008) and using the new state variable s, we can
rewrite (3) as
dst = (rst − ct) dt + σsdBt, (4)
where σs = σy/ (r + ρ) is the unconditional variance of the innovation to st.13 It is not difficult to
show that the above model with the univariate income process, (1), can be easily extended to the
model with distinguishable multiple income components that have differencing persistence and
volatility coefficients. In this more complicated case, we can still apply the state-space-reduction
approach to simplify the model. To make our benchmark model tractable, we focus on the univari-
ate income specification.
In this benchmark full-information rational expectations (FI-RE) model, we assume that the
11It is well-known that the CARA utility specification is tractable for deriving optimal policies in different settings.
See Caballero (1990), Wang (2003, 2004), and Angeletos and La’O (2010).
12Here we need to impose the restriction that r > −ρ to guarantee below the finiteness of human wealth.
13In the next section, we will introduce robustness directly into this “reduced” precautionary savings model. It is not
difficult to show that the reduced univariate model and the original multivariate model are equivalent in the sense that
they lead to the same consumption and saving functions. The detailed proof is available from online appendix.
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consumer trusts the model and observes the state perfectly, i.e., no model uncertainty and no state
uncertainty. Denoting the value function by J (st). The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
for this optimizing problem can be written as:
0 = sup
ct
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (st) +D J (st)
]
,
where
D J (st) = Js (rst − ct) + 12 Jssσ
2
s . (5)
Solving the above HJB subject to (4) leads to the following consumption function:
ct = rst +Ψ− Γ, (6)
where Ψ = (δ− r) / (rγ) and
Γ ≡ 1
2
rγσ2s , (7)
is the consumer’s precautionary saving demand. Following the literature of precautionary savings,
we measure the demand for precautionary saving as the amount of saving due to the interaction
of the degree of risk aversion and uninsurable labor income risk. From (7), it can see that the
precautionary saving demand is larger for a larger value of the coefficient of absolute risk aversion
(γ), a more volatile income innovation
(
σy
)
, and a larger persistence coefficient (ρ).14
2.2. Incorporating Model Uncertainty due to Robustness
Robustness (robust control or robust filtering) emerged in the engineering literature in the 1970s
and was introduced into economics and further developed by Hansen, Sargent, and others. A
simple version of robustness considers the question of how to make optimal decisions when the
decision maker does not know the true probability model that generates the data. The main goal
of introducing robustness is to design optimal policies that not only work well when the reference
(or approximating) model governing the evolution of the state variables is the true model, but
also perform reasonably well when there is some type of model misspecification. To introduce
robustness into our model proposed above, we follow the continuous-time methodology proposed
by Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2003) (henceforth, AHS) and adopted in Maenhout (2004) to
assume that consumers are concerned about the model misspecifications and take Equation (4) as
the approximating model.15 The corresponding distorting model can thus be obtained by adding
14As argued in Caballero (1990) and Wang (2004), a more persistent income shock takes a longer time to wear off and
thus induces a stronger precautionary saving demand of a prudent forward-looking consumer.
15As argued in Hansen and Sargent (2007), the agent’s committment technology is irrelevant under RB if the evolution
of the state is backward-looking. We therefore do not specifiy the committment technology of the consumer in the RB
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an endogenous distortion υ (st) to (4):
dst = (rst − ct) dt + σs (σsυ (st) dt + dBt) . (8)
As shown in AHS (2003), the objective D J defined in (5) can be thought of as E [dJ] /dt and plays
a key role in introducing robustness. A key insight of AHS (2003) is that this differential expec-
tations operator reflects a particular underlying model for the state variable because this operator
is determined by the stochastic differential equations of the state variables. Consumers accept the
approximating model, (4), as the best approximating model, but is still concerned that it is misspec-
ified. They therefore want to consider a range of models (i.e., the distorted model, (8)) surrounding
the approximating model when computing the continuation payoff. A preference for robustness
is then achieved by having the agent guard against the distorting model that is reasonably close
to the approximating model. The drift adjustment υ (st) is chosen to minimize the sum of (i) the
expected continuation payoff adjusted to reflect the additional drift component in (8) and (ii) an
entropy penalty:
inf
υ
[
D J + υ (st) σ2s Js +
1
2ϑt
υ2 (st) σ2s
]
, (9)
where the first two terms are the expected continuation payoff when the state variable follows (8),
i.e., the alternative model based on drift distortion υ (st).16 ϑt is fixed and state independent in
AHS (2003), whereas it is state-dependent in Maenhout (2004). The key reason of using a state-
dependent counterpart ϑt in Maenhout (2004) is to assure the homotheticity or scale invariance of
the decision problem with the CRRA utility function.17 Note that the evil agent’s minimization
problem, (9), becomes invariant to the scale of total resource st when using the state-dependent
specification of ϑt. In this paper, we also specify that ϑt is state-dependent (ϑ (st)) in the CARA-
Gaussian setting. The main reason for this specification is to guarantee the homotheticity, which
makes robustness not wear off as the value of the total wealth increases.18
Applying these results in the above model yields the following HJB equation under robustness:
sup
ct
inf
υt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (st) +D J (st) + υ (st) σ2s Js +
1
2ϑ (st)
υ2 (st) σ2s
]
, (10)
where the last term in the HJB above is due to the agent’s preference for robustness and reflects a
concern about the quadratic variation in the partial derivative of the value function weighted by
models of this paper.
16Note that the ϑ = 0 case corresponds to the standard expected utility case.
17See Maenhout (2004) for detailed discussions on the appealing features of “homothetic robustness”.
18In the detailed procedure of solving the robust HJB proposed in Appendix 8.2, it is clear that the impact of robustness
wears off if we assume that ϑt is constant.
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ϑ (st).19 Solving first for the infimization part of (10) yields:
υ (st)
∗ = −ϑ (st) Js,
where ϑ (st) = −ϑ/J (st) > 0. (See Appendix 8.2 for the derivation.) Following Uppal and Wang
(2003) and Liu, Pan, and Wang (2005), here we can also define “1/J (st)” in the ϑ (st) specification
as a normalization factor that is introduced to convert the relative entropy (i.e., the distance between
the approximating model and the distorted model) to units of uility so that it is consistent with the
units of the expected future value function evaluated with the distorted model. It is worth noting
that adopting a slightly more general specification, ϑ (st) = −ϕϑ/J (st) where ϕ is a constant, does
not affect the main results of the paper. The reason is as follows. We can just define a new constant,
ϑ˜ = ϕϑ, and ϑ˜, rather than ϑ, will enter the decision rules. Using a given detection error probability,
we can easily calibrate the corresponding value of ϑ˜ that affects the optimal consumption-portfolio
rules.20
Since ϑ (st) > 0, the perturbation adds a negative drift term to the state transition equation
because Js > 0. Substituting for υ∗ in (10) gives:
sup
ct
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (st) + (rst − ct) Js + 12σ
2
s Jss −
1
2
ϑ (st) σ2s J
2
s
]
. (11)
2.3. The Robust Consumption Function and Precautionary Saving
Following the standard procedure, we can then solve (11) and obtain the optimal consumption-
portfolio rules under robustness. The following proposition summarizes the solution:
Proposition 1. Under robustness, the consumption function and the saving function are
c∗t = rst +Ψ− Γ, (12)
and
d∗t = ft + Γ−Ψ, (13)
respectively, where ft = ρ (yt − y) / (r + ρ) is the demand for savings “for a rainy day”,Ψ (r) = (δ− r) / (rγ)
captures the dissavings effect of relative impatience,
Γ ≡ 1
2
rγ˜σ2s (14)
19See AHS (2003) and Maenhout (2004) for detailed discussions.
20See Section 4.2 for the detailed procedure to calibrate the value of ϑ using the detection error probabilities.
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is the demand for precautionary savings due to the interaction of income uncertainty, risk aversion, and
uncertainty aversion, and γ˜ ≡ (1+ ϑ) γ is the effective coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Finally, the
worst possible distortion is
υ∗ = rγϑ. (15)
Proof. See Appendix 8.2.
From (12), it is clear that robustness does not change the marginal propensity to consume out
of permanent income (MPC), but affects the amount of precautionary savings (Γ). In other words,
in the continuous-time setting, consumption is not sensitive to unanticipated income shocks. This
conclusion is different from that obtained in the discrete-time robust LQG-PIH model of Hansen,
Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) (henceforth, HST) in which the MPC increases with model uncertainty
determined by the interaction between RB and income uncertainty.21 It is worth noting that this
univariate RB model unique state variable s leads to the same consumption and saving functions
as the corresponding multivariate RB model in which the state variables are w and y. The intuition
behind this result is that the level of financial wealth w evolves deterministically over time, so that
the evil agent cannot influence it.22 Adopting the univariate setting here can significantly help
solve the model explicitly when we consider state uncertainty into the RB model.
Expression (14) shows that the precautionary savings demand is increasing with the degree
of robustness (ϑ) via increasing the value of γ˜ and interacting with the fundamental uncertainty:
labor income uncertainty (σ2s ). An interesting question here is the relative importance of RB (ϑ) and
CARA (γ) in determining the precautionary savings demand, holding other parameters constant.
We can use the elasticities of precautionary saving as a measure of their importance. Specifically,
using (14), we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2. The relative sensitivity of precautionary saving to robustness (RB, ϑ) and CARA (γ) can
be measured by:
µγϑ ≡ eγeϑ =
1+ ϑ
ϑ
> 1, (16)
where eϑ ≡ ∂Γ/Γ∂ϑ/ϑ and eγ ≡ ∂Γ/Γ∂γ/γ are the elasticities of the precautionary saving demand to RB and CARA,
respectively. (16) means that the precautionary savings demand is more sensitive to the coefficient of (abso-
lute) risk aversion measured by γ than RB measured by ϑ.
Proof. The proof is straightforward.
21Consequently, consumption is more sensitive to unanticipated shocks. See HST (1999) for a detailed discussion on
how RB affects consumption and precautionary savings within the discrete-time LQG setting.
22The proof of the equivalence between the univaritae and multivariate RB models is available from the corresponding
author by request.
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HST (1999) showed that the discount factor and the concern about robustness are observation-
ally equivalent in the sense that they lead to the same consumption and investment decisions in
a discrete-time LQG representative-agent permanent income model. The reason for this result is
that introducing a concern about robustness increases savings in the same way as increasing the
discount factor, so that the discount factor can be changed to offset the effect of a change in RB
on consumption and investment.23 In contrast, for our continuous-time CARA-Gaussian model
discussed above, we have a more general observational equivalence result between δ, γ, and ϑ:
Proposition 3. Let
γ f i = γ (1+ ϑ) ,
where γ f i is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion in the FI-RE model, consumption and savings are
identical in the FI-RE and RB models, holding other parameter values constant. Furthermore, let δ = r
in the RB model, and
δ f i = r− 1
2
ϑ (rγ)2 σ2s ,
where δ f i is the discount rate in the FI-RE model, consumption and savings are identical in the FI-RE and
RB models, ceteris paribus.
Proof. Using (12) and (14), the proof is straightforward.
3. General Equilibrium Implications of RB
3.1. Definition of the General Equilibrium
As in Huggett (1993) and Wang (2003), we assume that the economy is populated by a contin-
uum of ex ante identical, but ex post heterogeneous agents, with each agent having the saving
function, (14). In addition, we also assume that the risk-free asset in our model economy is a pure-
consumption loan and is in zero net supply. The initial cross-sectional distribution of income is
assumed to be its stationary distribution Φ (·). By the law of large numbers in Sun (2006), pro-
vided that the spaces of agents and the probability space are constructed appropriately, aggregate
income and the cross-sectional distribution of permanent income Φ (·) are constant over time.
Proposition 4. The total savings demand “for a rainy day” in the precautionary savings model with RB
equals zero for any positive interest rate. That is, Ft (r) =
´
yt ft (r) dΦ (yt) = 0, for r > 0.
23As shown in HST (1999), the two models have different implications for asset prices because continuation valua-
tions would alter as one alters the values of the discount factor and the robustness parameter within the observational
equivalence set.
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Proof. Given that labor income is a stationary process, the LLN can be directly applied and the
proof is the same as that in Wang (2003).
This proposition states that the total savings “for a rainy day” is zero, at any positive interest
rate. Therefore, from (13), for r > 0, the expression for total savings under RB in the economy at
time t can be written as:
D (ϑ, r) ≡ Γ (ϑ, r)−Ψ (r) . (17)
We can now define the equilibrium in our model as follows:
Definition 1. Given (17), a general equilibrium under RB is defined by an interest rate r∗ satisfying:
D (ϑ, r∗) = 0. (18)
3.2. Theoretical Results
The following proposition shows the existence of the equilibrium and the PIH holds in the RB
general equilibrium:
Proposition 5. There exists at least one equilibrium interest rate r∗ ∈ (0, δ) in the precautionary-savings
model with RB; if δ < ρ the equilibrium interest rate is unique on (0, δ). In equilibrium, each consumer’s
optimal consumption is described by the PIH, in that
c∗t = r∗st. (19)
Furthermore, the evolution equations of wealth and consumption are
dw∗t = ftdt, (20)
dc∗t =
r∗
r∗ + ρ
σydBt, (21)
respectively, where ft = ρ (yt − y) / (r∗ + ρ). Finally, the relative volatility of consumption growth to
income growth is
µ ≡ sd (dc
∗
t )
sd (dyt)
=
r∗
r∗ + ρ
. (22)
Proof. If r > δ, both Γ (ϑ, r) and Ψ (r) in the expression for total savings D (ϑ, r∗) are positive,
which contradicts the equilibrium condition: D (ϑ, r∗) = 0. Since Γ (ϑ, r)− Ψ (r) < 0 (> 0) when
r = 0 (r = δ), the continuity of the expression for total savings implies that there exists at least one
10
interest rate r∗ ∈ (0, δ) such that D (ϑ, r∗) = 0. To prove this equilibrium is unique, note that
∂D (ϑ, r)
∂r
= (1+ ϑ) γ
σ2
(r + ρ)2
(
1
2
− r
r + ρ
)
+
δ
r2γ
.
Let r > 0; the derivative is positive if
ρ > r.
Therefore, if ρ > δ there is only one equilibrium in (0, δ). From Expression (12), we can obtain the
individual’s optimal consumption rule under RB in general equilibrium as c∗t = r∗st. Therefore,
there exists a unique equilibrium in this aggregate economy. Substituting (72) into (3) yields (20).
Using (4) and (72), we can obtain (21).
The intuition behind this proposition is similar to that in Wang (2003). With an individual’s
constant total precautionary savings demand Γ (ϑ, r), for any r > 0, the equilibrium interest rate
r∗ must be at a level with the property that individual’s dissavings demand due to impatience
is exactly balanced by their total precautionary-savings demand, Γ (ϑ, r∗) = Ψ (r∗). Following
Caballero (1991) and Wang (2003, 2009), we set that γ = 1.5, σy = 0.309, and ρ = 0.128.24 Figure
1 shows that the aggregate saving function D (ϑ, r) is increasing with the interest rate, and there
exists a unique interest rate r∗ for every given ϑ such that D (ϑ, r∗) = 0.25
Given (12), (14), and (18), it is clear that even though precautionary saving at the individual
level increases with the degree of concerns about model misspecifications, the level of aggregate
savings is equal to zero in the general equilibrium. That is, RB does not affect the level of aggregate
wealth in the economy. Figure 1 shows how RB (ϑ) affects the equilibrium interest rate (r∗). It
is clear from the figure that the stronger the preference for robustness, the less the equilibrium
interest rate. From (22), we can see that RB can affect the volatility of consumption by reducing
the equilibrium interest rate. The following proposition summarizes the results about how the
persistence coefficient of income affects the impact of RB on the relative volatility:
Proposition 6. Using (22), we have:
∂µ
∂ϑ
=
ρ
(r∗ + ρ)2
∂r∗
∂ϑ
Q 0 iff ρ R 0,
because ∂r∗/∂ϑ < 0.
24In Section 4.1, we will provide more details about how to estimate the income process using the U.S. panel data.
The main result here is robust to the choices of these parameter values.
25We ignore negative interest rate equilibria because the resulting consumption function does not make economic
sense. It is easy to see that D has the same zeroes as a cubic function, so that there exist conditions under which the
equilibrium is globally unique, but these conditions are not amenable to analysis.
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Proof. The proof is straightforward.
In the next section, we will fully explore how RB affects the equilibrium interest rate and the
equilibrium dynamics of consumption after estimating the income process and calibrating the RB
parameter ϑ.
4. Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we first describe how we estimate the income process and calibrate the robustness
parameter. We then present quantitative results on how RB affects the equilibrium interest rate
and relative volatility of consumption to income.
4.1. Estimation of the Income Process
To implement the quantitative analysis, we need to first estimate the income process. That is, we
need to estimate ρ and σy in the income process specification (1). We use micro data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Following Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), we define
the household income as total household income (including wage, financial, and transfer income
of head, wife, and all others in household) minus financial income (defined as the sum of annual
dividend income, interest income, rental income, trust fund income, and income from royalties for
the head of the household only) minus the tax liability of non-financial income. This tax liability is
defined as the total tax liability multiplied by the non-financial share of total income. Tax liabilities
after 1992 are not reported in the PSID and so we estimate them using the TAXSIM program from
the NBER. Details on sample selection are reported in Appendix 8.1.
Following Floden and Lindé (2001), we normalize household income measures as ratios of
the mean for that year. We then exclude all household values in years in which the income is
less than 10% of the mean for that year or more than ten times the mean. To eliminate possible
heteroskedasticity in the income measures, we follow Floden and Lindé (2001) to regress each on
a series of demographic variables to remove variation caused by differences in age and education.
We next subtract these fitted values from each measure to create a panel of income residuals. We
then use this panel to estimate the household income process as specified by an stationary AR(1)
process by running panel regressions on lagged income. Specifically, we specify the AR(1) process
with Gaussian innovations as follows:
yt = φ0 + φ1yt−1 + σεt, t ≥ 1, |φ1| < 1, (23)
where εt ∼ N (0, 1), φ0 = (1− φ1) y, y is the mean of yt, and the initial level of labor income y0
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are given. Once we have estimates of φ1 and σ, we can recover the drift and diffusion coefficients
in the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process specified in (1). This can be done by rewriting (23) in the time
interval of [t, t + ∆t]:26
yt+∆t = φ0 + φ1yt + σ
√
∆tεt+∆t, (24)
where φ0 = µ (1− exp (−ρ∆t)) / (ρ∆t), φ1 = exp (−ρ∆t), σ = σy
√
(1− exp (−2ρ∆t)) / (2ρ∆t),
and εt+∆t is the time-(t + ∆t) standard normal distributed innovation to income. The estimation
results are reported in Table 1.
4.2. Calibration of the Robustness Parameter
To fully explore how RB affects the dynamics of consumption and labor income, we adopt the
calibration procedure outlined in HSW (2002) and AHS (2003) to calibrate the value of the RB pa-
rameter (ϑ) that governs the degree of robustness. Specifically, we calibrate ϑ by using the method
of detection error probabilities (DEP) that is based on a statistical theory of model selection. We
can then infer what values of ϑ imply reasonable fears of model misspecification for empirically-
plausible approximating models. The model detection error probability denoted by p is a measure
of how far the distorted model can deviate from the approximating model without being dis-
carded; low values for this probability mean that agents are unwilling to discard many models,
implying that the cloud of models surrounding the approximating model is large. In this case, it
is easier for the consumer to distinguish the two models. The value of p is determined by the fol-
lowing procedure. Let model P denote the approximating model, (4) and model Q be the distorted
model, (8). Define pP as
pP = Prob
(
ln
(
LQ
LP
)
> 0
∣∣∣∣ P) , (25)
where ln
(
LQ
LP
)
is the log-likelihood ratio. When model P generates the data, pP measures the
probability that a likelihood ratio test selects model Q. In this case, we call pP the probability of
the model detection error. Similarly, when model Q generates the data, we can define pQ as
pQ = Prob
(
ln
(
LP
LQ
)
> 0
∣∣∣∣Q) . (26)
Given initial priors of 0.5 on each model and the length of the sample is N, the detection error
probability, p, can be written as:
p (ϑ; N) =
1
2
(pP + pQ) , (27)
26Note that here we use the fact that ∆Bt = εt
√
∆t, where ∆Bt represents the increment of a Wiener process.
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where ϑ is the robustness parameter used to generate model Q. Given this definition, we can see
that 1− p measures the probability that econometricians can distinguish the approximating model
from the distorted model.
The general idea of the calibration procedure is to find a value of ϑ such that p (ϑ; N) equals a
given value (for example, 20%) after simulating model P, (4), and model Q, (8).27 In the continuous-
time model with the iid Gaussian specification, p (ϑ; N) can be easily computed. Since both models
P and Q are arithmetic Brownian motions with constant drift and diffusion coefficients, the log-
likelihood ratios are Brownian motions and are normally distributed random variables. Specifi-
cally, the logarithm of the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the distorted model (Q) with respect to
the approximating model (P) can be written as
ln
(
LQ
LP
)
= −
ˆ N
0
υdBs − 12
ˆ N
0
υ2ds, (28)
where
υ ≡ υ∗σs = r∗ϑγσs. (29)
Similarly, the logarithm of the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the approximating model (P) with
respect to the distorted model (Q) is
ln
(
LP
LQ
)
=
ˆ N
0
υdBs +
1
2
ˆ N
0
υ2ds. (30)
Using (25)-(30), it is straightforward to derive p (ϑ; N):
p (ϑ; N) = Pr
(
x < −υ
2
√
N
)
, (31)
where x follows a standard normal distribution. From the expressions of υ, (29), and p (ϑ; N), (31),
it is clear that the value of p is decreasing with the value of ϑ.
We first explore the relationship between the DEP (p) and the value of the RB parameter, ϑ.
A general finding is a negative relationship between these two variables. The left panel of Figure
2 illustrates how DEP (p) varies with the value of ϑ for different values of CARA (γ).28 We can
see from the figure that the stronger the preference for robustness (higher ϑ), the less the DEP (p)
27The number of periods used in the calculation, N, is set to be the actual length of the data.
28Based on the estimation results, we set y = 1, σy = 0.309, and ρ = 0.128. It is worth noting that the implied
coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) in our CARA utility specification can be written as: γc or γy. Given that
the value of the CRRA is very stable and υ can be expressed as rϑγσy/ (r + ρ), proportional changes in the mean and
standard deviation of y do not change our calibration results because their impacts on γ and σy are just cancelled out.
For example, if both y and σy are doubled, γ is reduced to half such that the product of γ and σy remains unchanged.
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is. For example, let γ = 1.5, then p = 0.22 and r∗ = 2.79% when ϑ = 2.5, while p = 0.31 and
r∗ = 3.02% when ϑ = 1.5.29 Both values of p are reasonable as argued in AHS (2002), HSW (2002),
Maenhout (2004), and Hansen and Sargent (Chapter 9, 2007). In other words, a value of ϑ between
1.5 and 2.5 is reasonable.30 Using (16), we have µγϑ = 1.4 and 1.67 when we set p = 0.22 and
0.31, respectively. That is, risk aversion is relatively more important than RB in determining the
precautionary savings demand given plausibly calibrated values of ϑ.
The right panel of Figure 2 illustrates how DEP (p) varies with ϑ for different values of σy when
γ equals 1.5.31 It also shows that the higher the value of ϑ, the less the DEP (p). In addition, to
calibrate the same value of p, less values of σy (i.e., more volatile labor income processes) leads to
higher values of ϑ.32 The intuition behind this result is that σs and ϑ have opposite effects on υ.
(It is clear from (29).) To keep the same value of p, if one parameter increases, the other one must
reduce to offset its effect on υ.
An important comment follows these calibration results. As emphasized in Hansen and Sar-
gent (2007), in the robustness model, p can be used to measure the amount of model uncertainty,
whereas ϑ is used to measure the degree of the agent’s preference for RB. If we keep p constant
when recalibrating ϑ for different values of γ, ρ, or σy, the amount of model uncertainty is held
constant, i.e., the set of distorted models with which we surround the approximating model does
not change. In contrast, if we keep ϑ constant, p will change accordingly when the values of γ, ρ,
or σy change. That is, the amount of model uncertainty is “elastic” and will change accordingly
when the fundamental factors change.
4.3. Effects of RB on the Equilibrium Interest Rate and Consumption Volatility
As shown in the theoretic results, the equilibrium interest rate and relative volatility of consump-
tion to income are jointly determined by the degree of robustness, the risk aversion, and the income
process. To better see how RB affects the equilibrium interest rate and the relative volatility, we
present two quantitative exercises here. The first exercise fixes the parameters of the income pro-
cess at the estimated values and allows the risk aversion parameter to change, while the second
exercise fixes risk aversion parameter and allows the key income process parameter to vary.
Figure 3 shows that the equilibrium interest rate and the equilibrium relative volatility decrease
with the calibrated value of ϑ for different values of γ when σy = 0.309, and ρ = 0.128. For
29Caballero (1990) and Wang (2009) also consider the γ = 2 case.
30As shown by Figure 2, when DEP declines, ϑ increases monotonically.
31Since σs = σy/ (r + ρ), both changes in the persistence coefficient (ρ) and changes in volatility coefficient
(
σy
)
will
change the value of σs.
32It is straightforward to show that a reduction in ρ has similar impacts on the calibrated value of ϑ as an increase in
σy.
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example, when ϑ is increased from 1.5 to 2 (i.e., when p decreases from 0.313 to 0.223), r∗ is reduced
from 3.02% to 2.79%, and µ is reduced from 0.191 to 0.179 when γ = 1.5. In addition, the figure
also shows that the interest rate and the relative volatility decrease with γ for different values of ϑ.
Figure 4 shows that the equilibrium interest rate and the equilibrium relative volatility decrease
with the value of ϑ for different values of σy when γ = 1.5 and ρ = 0.128. The pattern of this figure
is similar to that of Figure 3. In addition, the figure also shows that the interest rate and the relative
volatility decrease with σy for different values of ϑ. For example, when σy is doubled from 0.2 to
0.4, r∗ is reduced from 3.48% to 2.66% and µ is reduced from 0.214 to 0.172 when γ = 1.5 and
ϑ = 1.5.
Using the same constructed panel of household income and consumption described in the pre-
vious subsection, Figure 5 shows the relative dispersion of consumption, defined as the ratio of
the standard deviation of the consumption change to the standard deviation of the income change
between 1980 and 2000.33 From the figure, the average empirical value of the relative volatility
(µ) is 0.209, and the minimum and maximum values of the empirical relative volatility are 0.159
and 0.285, respectively. Comparing these results with Figures 3 and 4, we can see that our model,
with plausibly estimated and calibrated parameter values, can match the empirical evidence on
the relative volatility of consumption to income.
4.4. The Welfare Cost of Model Uncertainty
We can also quantify the effects of RB on the welfare cost of volatility in the general equilibrium
using the Lucas elimination-of-risk method. (See Lucas 1987, 2000; Tallarini 2000).34 It is worth
noting that although we do not discuss the welfare costs of business cycles in our heterogeneous-
agent economy without aggregate uncertainty, we can still use the Lucas approach to explore the
welfare cost of model uncertainty due to RB.35 Specifically, following the literature, we define the
total welfare cost of volatility as the percentage of permanent income the consumer is ready to give
33Details on how the panel data are constructed are described in Appendix 8.1.
34Tallarini (2000) found that the welfare costs of aggregate fluctuations are non-trivial when the representative agent
has a recursive utility that breaks the link between risk aversion and intertemporal substitution. However, in Tallarini’s
model, high welfare costs also require the agent to have implausibly high levels of risk aversion. In contrast, Barillas,
Hansen, and Sargent (2009) showed that the high coefficients of risk aversion in Tallarini (2000) may not only reflect the
agent’s risk attitudes but also reflect his concerns about model misspecification. They found that market prices of model
uncertainty contain information about the benefits of removing model uncertainty, not the consumption fluctuations
that Lucas (1987, 2000) studied.
35Ellison and Sargent (2014) found that idiosyncratic consumption risk has a greater impact on the cost of business
cycles when they fear model misspecification. In addition, they showed that endowing agents with fears about mis-
specification leads to greater welfare costs that the exisiting idiosyncratic consumption risk.
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up at the initial period to be as well off in the FI-RE economy as he is in the RB economy:36
J˜ (s0 (1− ∆)) = J (s0) , (32)
where
J˜ (s0 (1− ∆)) = − 1
α˜1
exp (−α˜0 − α˜1s0 (1− ∆)) and J (s0) = − 1
α1
exp (−α0 − α1s0)
are the value functions under FI-RE and RB, respectively, ∆ is the compensating amount measured
by the percentage of s0, α1 = r∗γ, α˜1 = r˜∗γ, α0 = δ/r∗ − 1 − (1+ ϑ) r∗γ2σ2s /2, α˜0 = δ/r˜∗ −
1 − r˜∗γ2σ˜2s /2, and r∗ and r˜∗ are the equilibrium interest rates in the RB and FI-RE economies,
respectively.37 The following proposition summarizes the result about how RB affects the welfare
costs in general equilibrium:
Proposition 7. When the equilibrium condition, (18), holds, the welfare costs due to model uncertainty can
be written as:
∆ =
s0 (α˜1 − α1)− ln (α˜1/α1)
α˜1s0
=
(
1− r
∗
r˜∗
)
− 1
r˜∗γs0
ln
(
r˜∗
r∗
)
, (33)
which implies that
∂∆
∂ϑ
=
∂∆
∂r∗
∂r∗
∂ϑ
> 0
because ∂r∗/∂ϑ < 0, and ∂∆/∂r∗ = −1/r˜∗ [1− 1/ (r∗γs0)] < 0 for plausible parameter values.
Proof. Substituting (18) into the expressions of α0 and α˜0 in the value functions under FI-RE and
RB, we obtain that α0 = α˜0 = 0. Combining these results with (32) yields (33).
To do quantitative welfare analysis, we need to know the initial level of s, s0. We assume that
s0 = E [s] and the ratio of the initial level of financial wealth (w0) to mean income (y0 ≡ E [yt])
is 5, that is, w0/y0 = 5.38 Given that y0 = 1, γ = 1.5, and ρ = 0.128, we can easily calculate
that s0 = w0 + y0/r.39 Figure 6 illustrates how the welfare cost of model uncertainty varies with
ϑ for different values of γ and σy.40 We can see from this figure that the welfare costs of model
36This approach is also used in Epaulard and Pommeret (2003) to examine the welfare cost of volatility in a
representative-agent model with recursive utility. In their model, the total welfare cost of volatility is defined as the
percentage of capital the representative agent is ready to give up at the initial period to be as well off in a certain
economy as he is in a stochastic one.
37See Appendix 8.2 for the derivation of the value functions. Note that ∆ = 0 when ϑ = 0.
38This number varies largely for different individuals, from 2 to 20. 5 is the average wealth/income ratio in the
Survey of Consumer Finances 2001. We find that changing the value of this ratio does not change our conclusion about
the welfare implication of RB.
39Note that here we use the definition of st: st = wt + yt/ (r + ρ) + ρy/ [r (r + ρ)].
40When generating the left and right panels of this figure, we set σy = 0.309 and γ = 1.5, respectively.
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uncertainty are nontrivial, and increase with γ and σy. The intuition behind this result is that
higher income uncertainty leads to higher the induced model uncertainty. For example, when
γ = 1.5 and ϑ = 1.5, the welfare cost of model uncertainty ∆ is 5.37%. When ϑ increases from
1.5 to 2.5, ∆ increases from 5.37% to 13.64%. Furthermore, the figure also shows that an increase
income volatility can significantly increase the welfare cost of model uncertainty. For example,
when γ = 1.5, ϑ = 1.5, and income volatility
(
σy
)
is reduced from 0.4 to 0.2, ∆ decreases from 6.7%
to 3.13%. We can thus learn from this result that macroeconomic policies that aim to reduce income
inequality are beneficial in an economy in which agents have a fear of model misspecification.
5. Further Discussion on the Impact of RB on the Interest Rate
Our theoretical and quantitative results obtained in the previous sections have implications for
explaining the observed low real interest rate as well as the declines in the equilibrium real interest
rate (or the natural rate of interest) in the U.S. economy. We discuss them in this section.
5.1. The Observed Low Interest Rate
Our theoretical results show that a larger concern about model uncertainty lowers the equilibrium
real interest rate. In the U.S. the average real risk-free interest rate is about 1.15 percent between
1985 and 2014.41 The full-information model without RB requires the coefficient of risk aversion
parameter to be 10 to match this rate.42 This value of CRRA might be too high to be plausible for
ordinary consumers. In contrast, when consumers take into account model uncertainty, the model
can generate an equilibrium interest rate of 1.15 percent with much lower values of the coefficient
of risk aversion.43 Figure 7 shows the relationship between γ and ϑ for the given real interest rate
1.15%.44 For example, when γ = 5 and ϑ = 3, the RB model leads to the same interest rate as in the
FI model with γ = 10. Using the same calibration procedure discussed in Section 4.1, we find that
the corresponding DEP is p = 0.16. In other words, agents have 16% probability that they cannot
distinguish the distorted model from the approximating model. As argued in Hansen and Sargent
41Following Campbell (2003), we calculate the average of the real 3-month Treasury yields. The averages from the
beginning of 1985 to the end of 2014 are 0.88% using core CPI inflation and 1.37% using core PCE inflation. Therefore,
depending on what inflation index is used, the risk-free rate is between 0.9 and 1.4. (In our following discussion, we
set the risk free rate to be 1.15 which is the average of the two real interest rates under CPI and PCE.) We choose this
period because it is more consistent with our sample period in estimating the income process. The average 3-month
real treasury yields over the 1949− 2014 period is 0.79% using headline CPI inflation. Notice that the core CPI inflation
became available only starting from 1958.
42Note that since we set the mean income level to be 1, the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) evaluated at
this level is equal to the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (CARA).
43This result is comparable to that obtained in Barillas, Hansen, and Sargent (2009). They found that most of the
observed high market price of uncertainty in the U.S. can be reinterpreted as a market price of model uncertainty rather
than the traditional market price of risk.
44The pattern is robust for different values of the equilibrium interest rate.
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(2007) and in Section 4.2, this value seems reasonable in the literature. In summary, incorporating
model uncertainty due to RB can relax the restriction on CRRA imposed by the model and thus
has the potential to explain the low interest rate we observed in the U.S. economy.
5.2. Declines in the Equilibrium Real Interest Rate in the U.S.
Recent studies on monetary policy suggest a possible decline in the U.S. equilibrium real interest
rate (Hamilton et al., 2015). In the monetary policy literature, this equilibrium real interest rate
is also called the natural rate of interest or the neutral rate of interest, which simply refers to the
equilibrium interest rate that is consistent with full employment and stable inflation.45 Within the
context of a New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model, it is the equi-
librium rate when the economy has no wage and price rigidities and no shocks to wage markups,
price markups, or technology. This concept is important because it helps to determine the level
at which policymakers should set the interest rate to be given the current inflation and economic
conditions. In general, when the equilibrium interest rate is lower, policymakers should also lower
the nominal interest rate (i.e., the federal funds rate in the U.S.) to keep the economy to stay at or
move back to a full employment level with stable inflation (i.e, an inflation level of 2 percent in the
U.S.).
The equilibrium real interest rate is unobserved because the real economy consists of distor-
tions such as price and wage rigidities as mentioned above. However, many researchers have
applied statistical methods to estimate the equilibrium real interest rate and show it has been
lower , especially following the financial crisis (Laubach and Williams 2003, 2014 and Hamilton
et al., 2015). Figure 8 plots Laubach and Williams’ estimates. It clearly shows the equilibrium real
interest rate became significantly lower after the 2007-09 financial crisis.46
Our results provide an explanation for a lower equilibrium interest rate by showing an increase
in model uncertainty (i.e., an increase in ϑ) could contribute to a decline in the equilibrium real in-
terest rate. First, the comparison between a model without model uncertainty (the FI-RE model)
with a model taking into account model uncertainty (the RB model) shows agents’ concern about
model misspecification will increase aggregate savings and thus drives down the equilibrium in-
terest rate. Second, within the RB framework, we show an increase in the degree of model uncer-
tainty will further reduce the equilibrium interest rate through increasing precautionary savings.
45In a Taylor rule (Taylor 1993, 1999), it is the r∗ in the rule: it = r∗ + pit + αpi(pit − pi∗) + αy(yt − y∗t ), where pi∗ is the
inflation target and y∗ is potential output. Policymakers thus set the nominal interest rate (i) based on the equilibrium
real interest rate (r∗), inflation (pi), inflation gap (pit − pi∗), and output gap (yt − y∗t ).
46It worth noting that in a standard Taylor rule which prescribes the monetary policy, the equilibrium interest rate
is set to be a constant. In other words, a change in this equilibrium interest rate could be interpreted as a change in
fundamentals in the economy.
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The explanation that agents have become more concerned about model misspecification after the
2007− 09 financial crisis is not unreasonable given the long and deep recession which generated
skepticism about whether the standard macro models can fully capture how the economy is work-
ing. Actually, as Figure 8 shows, most large declines in the equilibrium rate followed recessions,
which is consistent with the view that recessions may have caused people to be more concerned
about how the economy is truly working. Consider the following numerical example. Before the
financial crisis, the equilibrium real interest rate is 2% when γ = 3 and ϑ = 2. After the financial
crisis, consumers became more concerned about the true model governing the macroeconomy and
ϑ is thus increased from 2 to 6; consequently, the equilibrium interest rate reduces to 1.4%.
It is worth noting that the explanation of a lower equilibrium real interest rate due to higher
savings is not new. Summers (2014) and Blanchard et al. (2014) also argue that increases in global
savings could be a reason for a lower equilibrium real interest rate in the U.S. and other advanced
economies. However, their explanations for higher savings usually rely on demographic trends
(such as an aging population) and capital flows from emerging economies to advanced economies,
while our explanation for increases in savings comes purely from agents’ concern about model
uncertainty. In addition, neither of these papers provides a structural model to quantify the effects,
while we explicitly solve a stochastic general equilibrium model to show both the channel and the
effect.
6. Extensions
In this section, we consider three extensions. In the first extension, we assume that consumers
have recursive utility and thus risk aversion and intertemporal substitution are separated in their
preferences. In the second extension, we consider incomplete information about individual income
(IC). Specifically, in this extension we assume that consumers only observe total income and cannot
perfect distinguish individual income components (see Muth 1960, Pischke 1995 and Wang 2003).
In the third extension, we incorporate regime-swtiching in income process into the benchmark
model and discuss how regime-switching in income growth affects individual consumption and
savings decisions and the equilibrium interest rate.
6.1. Separation of Risk Aversion and Intertemporal Substitution
In the previous sections, we discussed how the interaction of risk aversion and robustness affects
the equilibrium interest rate, consumption volatility, and welfare costs of model uncertainty. How-
ever, given the time-separable utility setting, we cannot examine how intertemporal substitution
affects the equilibrium outcomes. In this section, we consider a continuous-time recursive utility
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(RU) model with iso-elastic intertemporal substitution and exponential risk aversion. This recur-
sive utility specification is proposed in Weil (1993) in a discrete-time consumption-saving model.
In our continuous-time setting, the Bellman equation for the optimization problem can be written
as:
J (st)
1−1/ε = max
ct
{(
1− e−δdt
)
c1−1/εt + e
−δdtCE1−1/εt
}
(34)
subject to (4), where ε is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, δ is the discount rate, γ is the
coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and
CEt≡− 1
γ
ln (Et [exp (−γJ (st+dt))])
denotes the certainty equivalent in terms of period-t consumption of the uncertain total utility in
the future periods. Furthermore, (34) can be reduced to
0 = max
ct
{
δc1−1/εt − δ J˜ (st) +
(
rst − ct − 12γAσ
2
s
)
J˜s (st)
}
, (35)
where J˜ (st) = J (st)
1−1/ε = (Ast + A0)1−1/ε, and A and A0 are undetermined coefficients.47 (See
Online Appendix for the derivation.)
If the consumer trusts the model represented by (4), we can solve for the consumption function
and the corresponding value function as follows:
c∗t = [r + (δ− r) ε] st −
1
2
γA
[
1+
(
δ
r
− 1
)
ε
]
σ2s (36)
and J (st) = Ast + A0, where A =
[
r+(δ−r)ε
δε
]1/(1−ε)
and A0 = −γA2σ2/ (2r).48 Here we need to
impose that r + (δ− r) ε > 0 to guarantee the existence of an optimal plan. In addition, as in Weil
(1993), we also need to assume that the initial financial wealth level, w0, is sufficiently high and
the share of risky human wealth is sufficiently low in total wealth to guarantee that consumption
would not become negative in finite time with positive probability.
47Note that here we use the fact that the log-exponenial operator can be simplified to:
ln (Et [exp (−γJ (st+dt))]) = −γAst − γA0 − γA (rst − ct) dt + 12γ
2 A2σ2s dt.
48Note that when δ = r, i.e., the discount rate equals the interest rate, the consumption rule reduces to: c∗t = rst −
1
2γσ
2
s , which means that consumption is independent of intertemporal substitution in this special case.
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6.1.1. Consumption and Saving Rules under RB
To introduce robustness into the above recursive utility model, we follow the same procedure as
in the previous section and write the distorting model by adding an endogenous distortion υ (st)
to the law of motion of the state variable st,
dst = (rst − ct) dt + σs (σsυ (st) dt + dBt) . (37)
The drift adjustment υ (st) is chosen to minimize the sum of the expected continuation payoff, but
adjusted to reflect the additional drift component in (37), and of an entropy penalty:
0 = sup
ct
inf
υt
{
δc1−1/εt − δ J˜ (st) +
(
rst − ct − 12 Aασ
2
s
)
J˜s (st) + σ2s υt J˜s (st) +
1
2ϑt
σ2s υ
2
t
}
,
where J˜ (st) = (Ast + A0)
1−1/ε and J˜s (st) = (1− 1/ε) A (Ast + A0)−1/ε. The following proposi-
tion summarizes the solution to this RB problem:
Proposition 8. Given ϑ, the optimal consumption and saving functions under robustness are
c∗t = rst +Ψt − Γ, (38)
d∗t = ft −Ψt + Γ, (39)
respectively, where ft = ρ (yt − y) / (r + ρ) is the demand for savings “for a rainy day”,
Ψt ≡ (δ− r) εst (40)
captures the dissavings effect of relative impatience,
Γ ≡ 1
2
A
r
(
A1−εδe
)
γ˜σ2s (41)
is the precautionary savings demand, γ˜ ≡ γ+ ϑ is the effective coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and
A =
[
r + (δ− r) ε
δε
]1/(1−ε)
≥ r, (42)
Proof. See Online Appendix.
When δ = r, A = r and this RU model is reduced to the benchmark model. The reason is that
when the interest rate equals the discount rate, the effect of EIS on consumption growth and saving
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disappears. When δ 6= r, A is increasing in ε. (We can see this from Figure 9.)49 From (38), (40),
and (41), we can see that EIS affects both the MPC out of st and Γ when δ 6= r. Specifically, both
MPC and the precautionary saving demand increases with ε when δ > r. It is worth noting that
the OE between the discount factor and a concern about robustness established in HST (1999) also
no longer holds in this RU model. It is clear from (38) to (41) that δ affect the MPC, r + (δ− r) ε,
whereas ϑ does not appear in the MPC.
The saving function, (39), can be decomposed as follows:
d∗t = ft −Ψ1,t −Ψ2 + Γ, (43)
where
Ψ1,t ≡ (δ− r) ε (st − s) and Ψ2 ≡ (δ− r) εs.
The term, Ψt = Ψ1,t +Ψ2,t, captures the dissaving effect due to relative impatience, which is affine
in the value of total source, the sum of financial wealth and human wealth. Furthermore, Ψ1,t is
a mean reverting process and Ψ2 is a constant term. It is worth noting that this part of saving
measures consumers’ intertemporal consumption smoothing motive, and is independent of the
degree of risk aversion and labor income uncertainty. Unlike the benchmark model with the time-
additive utility, in the RU case the Ψt term increases with the value of total wealth (st) when the
consumers are relatively more impatient, i.e., δ > r. This result is consistent with that obtained
in Wang (2006) in which the dissaving effect is generated by the endogenous discount factor. In
addition, the Ψt term can also capture the intuition that richer consumers are more impatient and
thus dissave more in the long run used to model the endogenous discount factor.
6.1.2. General Equilibrium Implications
Using the individual saving function (43) and following the same aggregation procedure used in
the previous sections, we have the following result on the total saving demand:
Proposition 9. Both the total demand of savings “for a rainy day” and the total demand for the estimation-
risk-induced savings in the RB model with IC equal zero for any positive interest rate. That is, Ft (r) =´
yt ft (r) dΦ (yt) = 0 and Ht (r) =
´
st Ψ1,tdΦs (st) = 0, for r > 0.
Proof. The proof uses the LLN and is the same as that in Wang (2003).
49Empirical studies using aggregate data usually find the EIS to be close to zero, whereas calibrated RBC models
usually require it to be close to one. For example, Hall (1988) found in the expected utility setting that the value of ε is
close to 0.1. Guvenen (2006) allowed heterogeneity and estimated that the true value of ε is 0.47 in an economy with
both stockholders who have high EIS and non-stockholders who have low EIS. Although theoretically we cannot rule
out the ε > 1 case, we follow the literature and assume that ε ≤ 1 in this paper.
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This proposition states that the total savings “for a rainy day” is zero, at any positive interest
rate. Therefore, from (43), after aggregating across all consumers, the expression for total savings
in this RU model can be written as:
D (r) ≡ Γ (r)−Ψ2 (r) , (44)
where the first term measures the amount of precautionary savings due to risk aversion and un-
certainty aversion, and the second term captures the steady state dissavings effects of impatience.
As in the benchmark model, we define the equilibrium in our model as: D (r∗) = 0. The following
proposition shows the existence of the equilibrium and the PIH holds in the general equilibrium:
Proposition 10. There exists at least one equilibrium with an interest rate r∗ ∈ (0, δ) in the RB model with
IC. In any such equilibrium, each consumer’s optimal consumption is described by the PIH, in that
c∗t = [r∗ + (δ− r) ε] st − (δ− r) εs. (45)
Furthermore, in this equilibrium, the evolution equations of wealth and consumption are
dw∗t = ( ft −Ψ1,t) dt, (46)
dc∗t = [r∗ + (δ− r∗) ε] dst, (47)
respectively. Finally, the relative volatility of consumption growth to income growth is
µ ≡ sd (dc
∗
t )
sd (dyt)
=
r∗ + (δ− r∗) ε
r∗ + ρ
. (48)
Proof. If r > δ, D (ϑ, r∗) > 0 because Γ > 0 and Ψ2 < 0, which contradicts the equilibrium
condition: D (ϑ, r∗) = 0. When r = δ, it is straightforward to show that Γ > 0 and Ψ2 = 0, which
implies that Since Γ− Ψ2 > 0. When r converges to 0, Ψ2 > 0 and Γ converges to 0 because the
value of A/r converges to 1, which implies that Γ− Ψ2 < 0. The continuity of the expression for
total savings thus implies that there exists at least one interest rate r∗ ∈ (0, δ) such that D (r∗) =
Γ−Ψ2 = 0.
We can establish that uniqueness obtains on (0, δ) under a restriction that households are suffi-
ciently close to expected utility.
Proposition 11. The equilibrium is unique if ε > 0 is small enough.
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Proof. We have
∂D (ϑ, r)
∂r
> 0
if
(2ε− 1) r2 + (ρ− 3δε) r− δερ > 0.
There are no real roots of this quadratic if the discriminant is negative:
∆ = (ρ− 3δε)2 + 4 (2ε− 1) δερ.
A necessary condition for ∆ < 0 is 0 < ε < 12 ; thus, necessary conditions for uniqueness are
ε <
1
2
(2ε− 1) r2 + (ρ− 3δε) r− δερ > 0.
At ε = 0 the second condition reduces to
ρ > r,
which holds as before if ρ > δ. By continuity these conditions continue to be satisfied for ε close
enough to zero, so that D is monotonic on (0, δ).
Following the same calibration procedure adopted in Section 4.2, we can easily calibrate the
value of ϑ using the DEP. Specifically, given that υ∗ = ϑA, the DEP for this RU case, p (ϑ; N), can
be expressed as:
p (ϑ; N) = Pr
(
x < −υ
2
√
N
)
, (49)
where υ ≡ υ∗σs = ϑAσs. Since A increases with ε, (49) clearly shows that p decreases with ε for
given values of ϑ. For example, when ϑ = 2.5 and γ = 2, p decreases from p = 0.3465 to 0.3373
when ε increases from 0.5 to 0.9. That is, EIS does not have significant impacts on the amount of
model uncertainty facing the consumer if we fix ϑ and allow for elastic model uncertainty. This
result is not surprising because ε does not influence A significantly. (We can see this from Figure
9.)
Figure 10 shows that the aggregate saving function D (r) is increasing with the interest rate,
and there exists a unique interest rate r∗ for different values of ε such that D (r∗) = 0.50 From this
figure, it is clear that that the equilibrium interest rate (r∗) increases with ε. That is, the larger the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the larger the equilibrium interest rate. Furthermore, the
50As in the benchmark mode, here we also set that γ = 2 and ϑ = 1.5
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impact of ε on r∗ is significant. For example, r∗ increases from 0.88% to 1.87% as ε increases from
0.1 to 0.4. In addition, the impact of ε on µ is also significant. For example, µ decreases from 0.1173
to 0.2150 as ε increases from 0.1 to 0.4.
6.2. Incomplete Information about Individual Income Components
In this section, we consider a more realistic and interesting income specification. Following Wang
(2004), we assume that labor income has two distinct components:
yt = y1,t + y2,t,
where
dy1,t = (µ1 − ρ1y1,t) dt + σ1dB1,t, (50)
dy2,t = (µ2 − ρ2y2,t) dt + ρ12σ2dB1,t +
√
1− ρ12σ2dB2,t, (51)
and ρ12 is the instantaneous correlation between the two individual components, y1,t and y2,t.51
All the other notations are similar to that we used in our benchmark model. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume that ρ1 < ρ2. That is, the first income component is a unit root and the second
component is mean-reverting. It is straightforward to show that if both components in the income
process are observable, this model is essentially the same as our benchmark model. We therefore
consider a more interesting case in which consumers only observe total income but cannot observe
the two individual components. In this incomplete-information case, we need to use the filtering
technique to obtain the best estimates of the unobservable income components first and then solve
the optimization problem given the estimated income components. Following the same technique
adopted in Wang (2004), in the steady state in which the conditional variance-covariance matrix is
constant, we can obtain the following updating equations for the conditional means of (y1,t, y2,t):
d
 ŷ1,t
ŷ2,t
 =
 µ1 − ρ1ŷ1,t
µ2 − ρ2ŷ2,t
 dt +
 σ̂1
σ̂2
 dZt, (52)
where ŷi,t = Et [yi,t] and Zt is a standard Brownian motion. The standard deviations of dŷ1,t and
dŷ2,t are:
σ̂1 =
1
σ
[
(ρ2 − ρ1)Σ11 + σ21 + σ12
]
and σ̂2 =
1
σ
[− (ρ2 − ρ1)Σ11 + σ22 + σ12] ,
51Pischke (1995) considers a similar two-component income specification in a discrete-time setting.
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respectively, where
Σ11 =
1
(ρ2 − ρ1)2
(√
Θ2 +
(
1− ρ212
)
σ21σ
2
2 (ρ2 − ρ1)2 −Θ
)
(53)
is the steady state conditional variance of y1,t, σ =
√
σ21 + 2σ12 + σ
2
2 ,Θ = ρ1σ
2
2 + ρ2σ
2
1 +(ρ1 + ρ2) σ12,
and σ12 = ρ12σ1σ2.52 It is worth noting that for this bi-variate Gaussian income specification, Σ11
can fully characterize the estimation risk induced by partially observed income. Figure 11 illus-
trates how Σ11 varies with ρ2 and σ2/σ1.53 It clearly shows that given the persistence and volatility
coefficients of y1,t, the estimation risk increases with the persistence and volatility of y2,t (i.e., the
less ρ2 and the higher σ2/σ1).
Following the same procedure used in the benchmark model, we can introduce RB into this
incomplete-information (IC) model by assuming that the consumers take (52) as the approximating
model. The corresponding distorted model can thus be written as:
dŷ1,t = (µ1 − ρ1ŷ1,t) dt + σ̂1 (σ̂1υ1,tdt + dZt) , (54)
dŷ2,t = (µ2 − ρ2ŷ1,t) dt + σ̂2 (σ̂2υ2,tdt + dZt) , (55)
where we denote υt ≡
[
υ1,t υ2,t
]T
the distortion vector chosen by the evil agent. Following
the same procedure we use in the preceding sections, we can solve this IC model with RB. The
following proposition summarizes the solution to this IC model:
Proposition 12. Given ϑ, the consumption and saving functions under RB and IC are:
c∗t = r
[
wt +
1
r + ρ1
(
ŷ1,t +
µ1
r
)
+
1
r + ρ2
(
ŷ2,t +
µ2
r
)]
+Ψ− Γ, (56)
d∗t = ft + ht + Γ−Ψ, (57)
respectively, where ft = ρ1 (y1,t − y1) / (r + ρ1) + ρ2 (y2,t − y2) / (r + ρ2) captures the consumer’s de-
mand for savings “for a rainy day”, ht = rxt is the estimation-risk induced saving,
xt =
1
r + ρ1
(y1,t − ŷ1,t) + 1r + ρ2 (y2,t − ŷ2,t)
52The detailed derivation of these equations is similar to that in Wang (2004) and is available from the corresponding
author by request.
53Here we set ρ1 = 0, σ1 = 0.05, and ρ12 = 0. That is, the first income component is a unit root and the two
components are independent. The pattern of the figure does not change if these parameters change. The only exception
is the ρ12 = ±1 case. In this specifical, Σ11 = 0 because the two components are perfectly correlted and the bivariate
income specificaiton is essentially the same as the univariate income specification.
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is the estimation risk, Ψ = (δ− r) / (rγ) captures the dissavings effect of relative impatience, and
Γ =
1
2
rγ˜
(
σ̂1
r + ρ1
+
σ̂2
r + ρ2
)2
(58)
is the precautionary savings demand, where γ˜ ≡ (1+ ϑ) γ.
Proof. See Online Appendix.
Expression (58) shows that for given ϑ, IC increases precautionary savings by increasing the
variance of perceived permanent income from
(
σ1
r+ρ1
)2
+ 2 ρ12σ1σ2
(r+ρ1)(r+ρ2)
+
(
σ2
r+ρ2
)2
to
(
σ̂1
r+ρ1
+ σ̂2r+ρ2
)2
.54
In other words, both RB and IC lead to higher precautionary savings. Using the individual saving
function (57) and following the same aggregation procedure used in the previous sections, we have
the following result on the total saving demand:
Proposition 13. Both the total demand of savings “for a rainy day” and the total demand for the estimation-
risk-induced savings in the RB model with IC equal zero for any positive interest rate. That is, Ft (r) =´
yt ft (r) dΦ (yt) = 0 and Ht (r) =
´
xt ht (r) dΦx (xt) = 0, for r > 0.
Proof. The proof uses the LLN and is the same as that in Wang (2003).
This proposition states that the total savings “for a rainy day” and for the estimation risk is
zero, at any positive interest rate. Therefore, from (57), after aggregating across all consumers, we
define the equilibrium in this RB model with SU as: D (r∗) ≡ Γ (r∗) − Ψ (r∗) = 0, where D (r∗)
measures aggregate savings in equilibrium. The following proposition shows the existence of the
equilibrium and the PIH holds in the general equilibrium:
Proposition 14. There exists at least one interest rate r∗ ∈ (0, δ) in the RB model with IC. In any such
equilibrium, each consumer’s optimal consumption is described by the PIH, in that
c∗t = r∗
[
wt +
1
r∗ + ρ1
(
ŷ1,t +
µ1
r∗
)
+
1
r∗ + ρ2
(
ŷ2,t +
µ2
r∗
)]
. (59)
54Note that
∆ ≡
(
σ̂1
r + ρ1
+
σ̂2
r + ρ2
)2
−
[(
σ1
r + ρ1
)2
+
2ρ12σ1σ2
(r + ρ1) (r + ρ2)
+
(
σ2
r + ρ2
)2]
= 2rΣ11
[
(ρ2 − ρ1)
(r + ρ1) (r + ρ2)
]2
> 0.
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Furthermore, in this equilibrium, the evolution equations of wealth and consumption are
dw∗t = ( ft + ht) dt, (60)
dc∗t =
(
r∗
r∗ + ρ1
σŷ1 +
r∗
r∗ + ρ2
σŷ2
)
dZt, (61)
respectively, where ft = ρ1 (y1,t − y1) / (r∗ + ρ1)+ ρ2 (y2,t − y2) / (r∗ + ρ2) and ht = r∗ (y1,t − ŷ1,t) / (r∗ + ρ1)+
r∗ (y2,t − ŷ2,t) / (r∗ + ρ2). Finally, the relative volatility of consumption growth to income growth is
µ ≡ sd (dc
∗
t )
sd (dyt)
=
[(
r∗
r∗ + ρ1
σ̂1
)2
+
(
r∗
r∗ + ρ2
σ̂2
)2]
/
√
σ21 + 2σ12 + σ
2
2 . (62)
Proof. The proof is the same as that in the benchmark model in Section 3.
The sufficient conditions for uniqueness on (0, δ) are much more cumbersome than in the
benchmark case and we omit them (they involve the discriminant of a cubic). Continuity will
imply that the uniqueness result will still obtain if one component has small enough variance or
the correlation of the two shocks is close enough to 1 or −1, since these special cases reduce to the
univariate environment.
As in the above numerical analysis, we still set that γ = 2 and ϑ = 1.5 when examining how IC
interacts with RB in this model. In addition, we assume that ρ12 = 0 and ρ1 = 0. That is, the two
individual income components are uncorrelated and the first component is a unit root.55 The upper
panel of Figure 12 shows that the aggregate saving function D (r) is increasing with the interest
rate, and there exists a unique interest rate r∗ for different values of σ2/σ1 such that D (r∗) = 0.
From this figure, it is clear that that the equilibrium interest rate (r∗) decreases with σ2/σ1. That
is, the larger the standard deviation of the transitory income innovation, the less the equilibrium
interest rate. However, the impact of σ2/σ1 on r∗ is not significant. For example, r∗ decreases from
1.25% to 1.18% as σ2/σ1 increases from 0.2 to 2. In contrast, the impact of σ2/σ1 on µ is significant.
For example, µ decreases from 0.9809 to 0.4473 as σ2/σ1 increases from 0.2 to 2. The lower panel of
Figure 12 shows that the aggregate saving function D (r) is increasing with the interest rate, and
there exists a unique interest rate r∗ for different values of ρ2 such that D (r∗) = 0. This panel also
shows that the equilibrium interest rate (r∗) increases with ρ2. That is, the less the persistence of
the transitory income component, the larger the equilibrium interest rate. In addition, we find that
the impact of ρ2 on r∗ and µ are not very significant. For example, r∗ and µ increase from 1.14% to
1.24% and decreases from 0.7108 to 0.7073, respectively, as ρ2 increases from 0.1 to 0.5.
55Changing the values of ρ12 and ρ1 does not change our main results here. By setting them to be 0, we can use ρ2 and
σ2/σ1 to characterize the degree of IC. In addition, we set σ1 to be 0.05. Recall that this IC model can be reduced to the
case with perfect information about income when ρ2 = ρ1.
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6.3. Regime-Switching in Mean Income Growth
In this subsection, we consider aggregate uncertainty due to regime-switching. Specifically, we
assume that the mean income growth parameter, µ, is no longer constant and is governed by a
two-state continuous-time regime-switching process.56 For simplicity, here we assume that there
are two states for the macroeconomic condition: low-income growth (0) and high-income growth
(1). Specifically, let Xt = {0, 1} denote the regime for the economy’s income growth µt = {µ0, µ1}
at t. For a small time period ∆t, the state of µt jumps from 1 to 0 with the transition probability
pi1∆t and jumps from 0 to 1 with the transition probability pi0∆t. The transition densities, pi1 and
pi0, measure the persistence of the Markov chain:57
pi (Xt) =
 pi1, Xt = 1,pi0, Xt = 0. (63)
Under RB, the HJB can be written as
δJ1 (wt, yt) = max
ct
{
u (ct) + (rwt + yt − ct) J1w +
(
µ1 − ρyt
)
J1y +
1
2
σ2y J
1
yy −
1
2
ϑ1t σ
2
y
(
J1y
)2
+ pi1
(
J0 − J1
)}
,
(64)
δJ0 (wt, yt) = max
ct
{
u (ct) + (rwt + yt − ct) J0w +
(
µ0 − ρyt
)
J0y +
1
2
σ2y J
0
yy −
1
2
ϑ0t σ
2
y
(
J0y
)2
+ pi0
(
J1 − J0
)}
,
(65)
subject to the distorted equation:
dyt = ρ
(
µi
ρ
− yt
)
dt + σy
(
σyvit + dBt
)
, (66)
for i = 0, 1, where Ji (wt, yt) is the value function when the macro state is i, and the last terms in
(64) and (65) measure how regime-switching affects the expected change in the value function.
Following the same procedure as in the benchmark model, we can solve for robust consumption-
portfolio rules under regime-switching. The following proposition summarizes the solution:
Proposition 15. In the RB model with regime-switching, the consumption function and the saving function
are
cit = rs
i
t +Ψ (r)− Γi (ϑ, r) , (67)
56See Honda (2003) and Wang (2009) for studying optimal consumption and portfolio problem in a model with
regime-switching.
57The steady state distribution of the good and bad states in this regime-switching model are thus pi0pi1+pi0 and
pi1
pi1+pi0
,
respectively.
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and
dit = ft + Γ
i (ϑ, r)−Ψ (r) , (68)
where sit = wt +
yt
r+ρ+
µi
r(r+ρ) , ft = ρ (yt − y) / (r + ρ), Ψ (r) = δ−rrγ ,
Γi (ϑ, r) ≡ rγ˜σ
2
y
2 (r + ρ)2
+
pii
rγ
(exp (rγx)− 1) , (69)
where γ˜ ≡ (1+ ϑ) γ, and x > 0 is determined by
rx =
φ
r + ρ
+
pi1
rγ
(1− exp (rγx))− pi0
rγ
(1− exp (−rγx)) , (70)
for i = 1, 0, where φ = µ1 − µ0.58
Proof. See Online Appendix.
Expression (69) measures the precautionary saving demand in the regime-swtiching case. The
first term in (69) is the same as the expression for the precautionary saving demand in the bench-
mark model. The second term is the precautionary saving demand induced by the stochastic
regime-switching process.59
As in the benchmark model, we define the equilibrium in our model as: Di (r∗) = Γi (ϑ, r∗)−
Ψ (r∗) = 0, i.e.,
δ− r
rγ
=
rγ (1+ ϑ) σ2y
2 (r + ρ)2
+
pii
rγ
(exp (rγx)− 1) , (71)
where x ∼= φ(r+ρ)(r+pi0+pi1) .60
The following proposition shows the existence of the equilibrium and the PIH holds in the RB
general equilibrium:
Proposition 16. There exists at least one equilibrium interest rate r∗ ∈ (0, δ) in the RB model with regime-
switching. In any such equilibrium, each consumer’s optimal consumption is described by the PIH, in that
ci,∗t = r
i,∗sit, (72)
58If pi0 = pi1 = pi, (70) reduces to
rx =
φ
r + κ
+
pi
rγ
(exp (−rγx)− exp (rγx)) .
If φ = 0 (i.e., µ1 = µ0), x = 0.
59Note that when x = 0 or pi = 0, this term reduces to 0.
60This approximation is accurate because the value of rγx is a small value in equilibrium.
31
where sit = wt +
yt
r+κ+
µi
r(r+κ) .
Proof. If r > δ, both Γi (ϑ, r) and −Ψ (r) are positive, which contradicts the equilibrium condi-
tion: D (ϑ, r∗) = 0. Since Γi (ϑ, r) − Ψ (r) < 0 (> 0) when r = 0 (r = δ), the continuity of the
expression for total savings implies that there exists at least one interest rate r∗ ∈ (0, δ) such that
D (ϑ, r∗) = 0. From (12), we can obtain the individual’s optimal consumption rule under RB in
general equilibrium as ci,∗t = ri,∗sit for i = 1, 0.
As with the case above, the conditions that establish uniqueness are impenetrable and are there-
fore omitted. Again, we can use continuity to argue that if the regimes are sufficiently similar
uniqueness still obtains on (0, δ).
To explore how regime-switching affects the equilibrium interest rate via interacting with ro-
bustness. We first set γ = ϑ = 1.5 and pi1 = pi0 = 0.1.61 Figure 13 shows how the gap between
high- and low-income growth rates affects the equilibrium interest rate (r∗). It is clear from the
figure that for given values of RB, the larger the value of φ
(
= µ1 − µ0), the larger the value of x,
and the less the equilibrium interest rate. We then study how the transition probability between
the two states affects the equilibrium interest rate. Figure 14 shows the interest rate decreases with
the transition probability pi when pi0 = pi1 = pi.62 In this economy with RB, the precautionary sav-
ing demand due to regime-switching measured by φ and pi further drives down the equilibrium
interest rate.
However, if we assume that pi0 > pi1, the equilibrium interest rate is different across good
and bad regimes.63 When pi1 = 10% and pi0 = 15%, the interest rate is 2. 74% in the bad state,
while it is 2.83% in the good state.64 Under RB, if consumers are more concerned about model
misspecification in a recession (i.e., the value of ϑ is higher in a recession), they choose to save
more and thus further reduce the equilibrium interest rate.
7. Conclusions
This paper has developed a tractable continuous-time CARA-Gaussian framework to explore how
model uncertainty due to robustness affects the interest rate and the dynamics of consumption and
wealth in a general equilibrium heterogenous-agent economy. Using the explicit consumption-
61Wang (2009) considers two values, 0 and 3%, for the transition probabilities, pi. In Krusell and Smith (1998), they set
pi = 20% such that the average duration of a boom or a recession is five years.
62Here we also set γ = ϑ = 1.5 and φ = 0.04.
63In post-WWII U.S. data, we observe that the average length of a boom is longer than that of a recession.
64Here we set γ = ϑ = 1.5 and ϕ = 3%. The results are robust for higher values of pi0. For example, holding all the
other parameters fixed, if pi0 is increased from 0.15 to 0.2, the interest rate becomes 2. 70% in the bad state and 2.86% in
the good state.
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saving rules, we explored the relative importance of robustness and risk aversion in determining
precautionary savings. Furthermore, we evaluated the quantitative effects of model uncertainty
measured by the interaction of labor income uncertainty and calibrated values of the RB parame-
ter on the general equilibrium interest rate, consumption volatility, and the welfare costs of model
uncertainty. Finally, we studied how RB interacts with recursive utility, incomplete information
about income, and stochastic volatility in income, and affect the equilibrium interest rate and con-
sumption volatility.
8. Appendix
8.1. Data and Sample Selections
This appendix provides details on how we select the sample and construct a panel of both house-
hold income and consumption for our empirical analysis.
The PSID does not include enough consumption expenditure data to create full picture of
household nondurable consumption. Such detailed expenditures are found, though, in the Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. But households in this study
are only interviewed for four consecutive quarters and thus do not form a panel. To create a panel
of consumption to match the PSID income measures, we use an estimated demand function for
imputing nondurable consumption created by Guvenen and Smith (2014). Using an IV regression,
they estimate a demand function for nondurable consumption that fits the detailed data in the
CEX. The demand function uses demographic information and food consumption which can be
found in both the CEX and PSID. Thus, we use this demand function of food consumption and
demographic information (including age, family size, inflation measures, race, and education) to
estimate nondurable consumption for PSID households, creating a consumption panel.
Our household sample selection closely follows that of Blundell et al. (2008) as well.65 We ex-
clude households in the PSID low-income and Latino samples. We exclude household incomes in
years of family composition change, divorce or remarriage, and female headship. We also exclude
incomes in years where the head or wife is under 30 or over 65, or is missing education, region,
or income responses. We also exclude household incomes where non-financial income is less than
$1000, where year-over-year income change is greater than $90, 000, and where year-over-year con-
sumption change is greater than $50, 000. Our final panel contains 7, 220 unique households with
54, 901 yearly income responses and 50, 422 imputed nondurable consumption values.66
65They create a new panel series of consumption that combines information from PSID and CEX, focusing on the
period when some of the largest changes in income inequality occurred.
66There are more household incomes than imputed consumption values because food consumption - the main input
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In order to estimate the income process, we narrow the sample period to the years 1980− 1996,
due to the PSID survey changing to a biennial schedule after 1996. To further restrict the sample to
exclude households with dramatic year-over-year income and consumption changes, we eliminate
household observations in years where either income or consumption has increased more than
200% or decreased more than 80% from the previous year.
8.2. Solving the Benchmark RB Model
The Bellman equation associated with the optimization problem is
J (st) = sup
ct
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct) + exp (−δdt) J (st+dt)
]
,
subject to (8), where J (st) is the value function. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for
this problem is then
0 = sup
ct
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (st) +D J (st)
]
,
where D J (st) = Js (rst − ct) + 12 Jssσ2s . Under RB, the HJB can be written as
sup
ct
inf
υt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (st) +D J (st) + υ (st) σ2s Js +
1
2ϑ (st)
υ (st)
2 σ2s
]
subject to the distorting equation, (8). Solving first for the infimization part of the problem yields
υ∗ (st) = −ϑ (st) Js.
Given that ϑ (st) > 0, the perturbation adds a negative drift term to the state transition equation
because Js > 0. Substituting for υ∗ in the robust HJB equation gives:
sup
ct
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (st) + (rst − ct) Js + 12σ
2
s Jss −
1
2
ϑ (st) σ2s J
2
s
]
. (73)
Performing the indicated optimization yields the first-order condition for ct:
ct = − 1
γ
ln (Js) . (74)
variable in Guvenen and Smith’s nondurable demand function - is not reported in the PSID for the years 1987 and 1988.
Dividing the total income responses by unique households yields an average of 7− 8 years of responses per household.
These years are not necessarily consecutive as our sample selection procedure allows households to be excluded in
certain years but return to the sample if they later meet the criteria once again.
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Substituting (74) back into (73) to arrive at the partial differential equation (PDE):
0 = − Js
γ
− δJ +
(
rst +
1
γ
ln (Js)
)
Js +
1
2
(
Jss − ϑt J2s
)
σ2s . (75)
Conjecture that the value function is of the form
J (st) = − 1
α1
exp (−α0 − α1st) ,
where α0 and α1 are constants to be determined. Using this conjecture, we obtain that Js =
exp (−α0 − α1st) > 0 and Jss = −α1 exp (−α0 − α1st) < 0, and guess that
ϑ (st) = − ϑJ (st) =
α1ϑ
exp (−α0 − α1st) > 0.
(75) can thus be reduced to
−δ 1
α1
= − 1
γ
+
[
rst −
(
α0
γ
+
α1
γ
st
)]
− 1
2
α1 (1+ ϑ) σ2s .
Collecting terms, the undetermined coefficients in the value function turn out to be
α1 = rγ and α0 =
δ
r
− 1− 1
2
(1+ ϑ) rγ2σ2s .
Substituting them back into the first-order condition (74) yields the consumption function, (12), in
the main text.
Finally, we check if the consumer’s transversality condition (TVC),
lim
t→∞ E [exp (−δt) |J (st)|] = 0, (76)
is satisfied. Substituting the consumption function, c∗t , into the state transition equation for st
yields:
dst = Adt + σdBt,
where A = − δ−rrγ + 12 rγ˜σ2s under the approximating model. This Brownina motion with drift can
be rewritten as:
st = s0 + At + σ (Bt − B0) , (77)
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where Bt − B0 ∼ N (0, t). Substituting (77) into E [exp (−δt) |J (st)|] yields:
E [exp (−δt) |J (st)|] = 1
α1
E [exp (−δt− α0 − α1st)]
=
1
α1
exp
(
E [−δ− α0 − α1st] + 12 var (α1st)
)
=
1
α1
exp
(
−δt− α0 − α1 (s0 + At) + 12α
2
1σ
2t
)
= |J (s0) | exp
(
−
(
δ+ α1A− 12α
2
1σ
2
)
t
)
where |J (s0) | = 1α1 exp (−α0 − α1s0) is a positive constant and we use the facts that st − s0 ∼
N
(
At, σ2t
)
. Therefore, the TVC, (76), is satisfied if and only if the following condition holds:
δ+ α1A− 12α
2
1σ
2 = r +
1
2
(rγ)2 ϑσ2s > 0. (78)
Given the parameter values we consider in the text, it is obvious that the TVC is always satisfied
in both the FI-RE and RB models. It is straightforward to show that the TVC still holds under the
distorted model in which A = − δ−rrγ + 12 rγ˜σ2s − rγϑσ2s for plausible values of ϑ.
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Table 1. Estimation and Calibration Results
Parameter Values
Discrete specification, eq. (23)
constant φ0 0.0006
persistence φ1 0.88
std. of shock σ 0.29
Continuous-time specification, eq. (1)
persistence ρ 0.128
std. of income changes σy 0.309
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